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Abstract
Much has been written about the challenges of tackling climate change in post-political times. However, times have
changed significantly since the onset of the debate on post-politics in environmental scholarship. We have entered a politi-
cised, even polarised world which, as this article argues, a number of voices within the climatemovement paradoxically try
to bring together again. This article scrutinises new climate movements in a changing world, focusing on the School Strikes
for Climate in Belgium. It shows how the movement, through the establishment of an intergenerational conflict line and
a strong politicisation of tactics, has succeeded in putting the topic at the heart of the public agenda for months on end.
By claiming that we need mobilisation, not studying, the movement went straight against the hegemonic, technocratic
understanding of climate politics at the time. However, by keeping its demands empty and establishing a homogenised
fault line, the movement made itself vulnerable to forms of neutralisation and recuperation by forces which have an inter-
est in restoring the post-political consensus around technocratic and market-oriented answers to climate change. This
might also partly explain its gradual decline. Instead of recycling post-political discourses of the past, this article claims,
the challenge is to seize the ‘populist moment’ and build a politicisedmovement around climate change. One way of doing
that is by no longer projecting climate change into the future but reframing the ‘now’ as the moment of crisis which calls
on us to build another future.
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1. Introduction
It is Thursday 10 January 2019. It is cold on the streets.
A few people gather on the Carrefour de l’Europe nearby
Brussels Central station. The atmosphere is reserved
and nervous, almost feverish, at the same time. Would
other people show up? Or would they be the only
ones who decided to actually skip school and take to
the streets? Not much later, small groups of pupils
start flowing in from all sides. Slowly but certainly, the
square is thronged with people. The atmosphere relaxes.
Enthusiasm grows. People start giggling and shouting.
Some start singing. Soon, the square is too small for
the crowd that has gathered. The crowd starts moving
towards Rue de la Loi. Excitement rules. An improvised
and spontaneous demonstration takes to the streets.
More than 3000 young people, primarily secondary
school pupils, participate in this first Belgian climate
strike. They all responded to a Facebook video call of two
teenage girls, Anuna De Wever and Kyra Gantois, to skip
school for the climate. Their call was, in turn, inspired by
Greta Thunberg, the 15-year-old Swedish climate activist
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who had been striking for the climate since September
2018. With the initiative, Belgium was put on the map
as one of the first countries in Europe where School
Strikes for Climate took place. Belgium would also turn
out to be one of the countries with the highest num-
ber of participants, certainly relative to the size of the
country. On Thursday 17 January 2019, no fewer than
14,000 pupils take the streets. The week after, 35,000
strike for the climate. On Sunday 27 January, the School
Strikes for Climate feed into an earlier planned demon-
stration, leading to the biggest climate march ever in the
country, attracting more than 70,000 participants. After
this milestone, Youth for Climate, the platform which
has been established in the meantime and which calls
for the School Strikes for Climate in Belgium, decides to
opt for a number of local demonstrations. On Thursday
31 January, 30,000 climate strikers are counted in Leuven
and Liège. The week after, School Strikes for Climate take
place in several cities, among which Antwerp, Leuven,
Kortrijk, Brussels, Hasselt, Beringen, Liège, Bergen, and
Herve. In total, the new climate movement organises
20 strike days in Belgium. The last demonstration takes
place on Thursday 17 May, two days before the federal
and regional elections. With the exception of 15 March,
when the first Global Climate Strike for Future takes
place, the Belgian strikes never reach the number of
30,000 people again. Still, the numbers stay significant
for a long time.
The emergence of new social movements or, more
broadly, new forms of social upheaval, is always intrigu-
ing. Why is large-scale social protest triggered at a par-
ticular moment? How come some mobilisations barely
attract a few dozen people and others easily gather
thousands and more? What was so appealing about the
School Strikes for Climate? How come climate change
suddenly succeeded in inspiring so many young people?
A whole range of academic fields have tried to under-
stand social movements’ characteristics from a variety
of perspectives. At the same time, it appears impossible
to fully capture the rise of new forms of social upheaval
in theoretical frameworks. There always seems to be
something that escapes us. In that sense, like climate
change itself, climate mobilisations seem to be charac-
terised by unpredictability, non-linearity, feedback loops,
and threshold points.
Without pretending to give the final answer on the
‘how’ and ‘why’ of the School Strikes for Climate in
Belgium, in what follows, I will look at them from the
perspective of post-foundational political theory. More
in particular, I will draw on the work of Chantal Mouffe
(2002, 2006, 2018) and Erik Swyngedouw (2010, 2013a)
and, to a more limited extent, Jacques Rancière (1998,
2001) and Slavoj Žižek (1994, 2000). Key to this body
of work is the notion of ‘the political,’ which concerns
the ‘discourses’ through which social phenomena are
constructed and given meaning. Politicisation is consid-
ered a core ingredient for democratic politics, but ‘the
political’ can also get lost. This happens when discourses
portray themselves as being devoid of power, conflict,
and decision; realities which constitute the essence of
politics. Of key importance is that it is on the level of
ideas or representations—in other words, ‘discourses’—
that the (de)politicised nature of social movements has
to be assessed (Howarth, 2000; Howarth, Norval, &
Stavrakakis, 2000). Therefore, my focus will be not so
much on the movement’s social composition, resources,
or number of participants (for work that takes up this
challenge see, for instance, de Moor, de Vydt, Uba, &
Wahlström, 2020; Martiskainen et al., 2020), but on how
the movement understands, represents, or gives mean-
ing to itself and builds itself on this basis.
To that aim, I will write about the movement as a uni-
fied actor, even though I am aware that no such thing
as a fully unified movement ever exists. The focus will
be on the way in which the movement is represented to
the broader public by its spokespersons, and the way it
is framed on websites, social media, and television, and
in newspapers, and magazines. While I have interviewed
a number of people who joined the demonstrations, this
datawill not be the focus of the current analysis, as these
people did not actively participate in the movement’s
framing towards the broaderworld. I am aware that, con-
sequently, this article will not fully do justice to the diver-
sity of the movement, and that some people might not
recognise themselves in the picture I draw. For the sake
of arriving at a distinct political-theoretical analysis, and
because of the factual observation that a small group of
spokespersons had a tremendously important impact on
how the movement was presented to the outside world,
I will present a rather homogenised account focusing on
these public voices, partly making abstraction from the
plurality of viewpoints which were present within the
movement’s rank and file. In that context, it is also impor-
tant to underline that my analysis should not be read
merely as an argument about the movement, but also
as an intervention in the movement. In other words, it
should not be understood as a distant critique, but as a
way of building the movement exactly through engaging
in a critical debate. While I am fully aware of the limits
of the current analysis, it is my contention that looking
at new climate movements from the perspective of ‘the
political’ can help make sense of their successes and fail-
ures, as well as of the challenges, discussions, and ten-
sions they face.
In what follows, I will first sketch the changing politi-
cal condition within which the Belgian School Strikes for
Climate appeared. I will argue that we have moved from
a post-political to an increasingly politicised, even polar-
ising world, and that it is important to situate the move-
ment within this context. Second, I will contend that
the Belgian strikes have triggered a politicising dynamic
through their tactics, which were based on the contro-
versial claim that there is no point in attending school
when faced with climate change. Third, I will zoom in on
the movement’s choice for an intergenerational conflict
line, showing how this choice on the one hand pointed
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to a potential subject of change, but risked homogenis-
ing both the future and the present on the other. Fourth,
I will argue that this evolution, in combination with the
movement’s choice to keep its demands empty, opened
the door to the movement’s neutralisation and recuper-
ation, which may partly explain its subsequent decline.
I end the article with some reflections on how to seize
‘the populist moment’ (Mouffe, 2018) instead of recy-
cling the post-politics of the past.
2. The End of the Post-Political
A lot has been written about climate change and the
post-political (e.g., Bond, Diprose, & Thomas, 2019;
MacGregor, 2014; Machin, 2013; Maeseele, 2015; Kenis
& Lievens, 2014, 2015; Swyngedouw, 2007, 2010, 2013a).
This literature does not only deal with the difficulties
of tackling climate change in a depoliticised world, but
also with the way in which the predominant climate
narrative—characterised by its claim that ‘we are all in
this together,’ which often underpins presumedly neu-
tral market-oriented and technocratic policies—has his-
torically contributed to reinforcing post-political tenden-
cies. Indeed, the central argument of this literature
was not only that an overarching depoliticised atmo-
sphere influenced theway climate changewas hegemon-
ically approached, but also that the focus on an exter-
nalised enemy (CO2) and the lack of a privileged sub-
ject of change have played a significant role in strength-
ening what was considered a post-political condition
(Swyngedouw, 2010, 2013).
Importantly, the initial theories on the post-political
were developed in the late 1990s and the first decade
of the 21st century (Mouffe, 2002, 2006; Rancière, 1998,
2001; Žižek, 2000). The understanding of society in terms
of a post-political condition was rooted in a historical sit-
uation in which political parties tended towards the cen-
tre, the neoliberal political economy had gained a his-
torical victory, and consensus-seeking was key (Mouffe,
2002, 2006). The theoretical background of this litera-
ture, which was labelled post-foundational political the-
ory (Marchart, 2007), starts from a distinction between
‘politics,’ on the one hand, and ‘the political’ on the other.
Whereas the first refers to institutions like the parliament
or voting, the second refers to a logic of thinking and
acting which acknowledges the inevitability of division
and conflict. Stating that we lived in a post-political con-
dition therefore did notmean that therewould no longer
be ‘politics’ in the commonsensical meaning of the term
(think about the game of party politics, the parliament,
or voting), but that the constitutive dimension of con-
flict and plurality was not recognised anymore. The first
analyses of climate change andpost-politicswould follow
not much later (Swyngedouw, 2007, 2010). Importantly,
this was also the period when the international cli-
mate summits became strongly mediatised and public
events (Boykoff & Pearman, 2019), most notably COP15
in Copenhagen in 2009 and to a lesser extent COP21 in
Paris in 2015, which lent themselves well to analyses in
post-political terms (Goeminne, 2010; Kenis & Mathijs,
2014; Swyngedouw, 2013a). Climate change was hege-
monically approached in a market-oriented and techno-
cratic way, and presumably neutral win-win solutions
were advocated through which environmental, social,
and economic concerns could supposedly be smoothly
reconciled, and aroundwhich all stakeholders would eas-
ily unite (Kenis & Lievens, 2015; Swyngedouw, 2013a,
2015). Where dissident voices came to the fore, they
were often swiftly ridiculed,marginalised, and even crim-
inalised. In this context, a crucial question, both academ-
ically and in activist circles, was how to repoliticise cli-
mate change.
However, the global political constellation changed
significantly since the first work on climate change and
the post-political appeared. From the election of US pres-
ident Donald Trump in 2016 to the coming to power of
Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro in 2019, from the suc-
cess of extreme right-wing parties in Poland, France, and
Belgium to the rise of the tea party movement and the
alt-right: The world has seen a dynamic of politicisation,
even polarisation, though admittedly not entirely the
kind of repoliticisation many critics of the post-political
condition had pleaded or hoped for. To understand the
normative character of post-foundational political the-
ory, it is important to see that diagnosing the Zeitgeist
as post-political was never meant as amerely descriptive
gesture (Kenis, 2019). It has always been a form of ideol-
ogy critique, starting from an emancipatory and demo-
cratic perspective, and this is exactly what many critics
of the post-political thesis (McCarthy, 2013; Urry, 2011)
have failed to acknowledge. In other words, the ‘post-
political’ critique had a fundamental ‘political’ inten-
tion. Its aim was to denounce the undemocratic char-
acter of post-political affairs, and to generate a space
in which resistance and opposition could become legiti-
mate options again (Mouffe, 2006, 2018; Rancière, 1998;
Žižek, 2000). The theoretical strategy to do this was to
make the lack of an ultimate foundation of the hege-
monic order visible and thereby contestable.
Looking from that perspective at the international
evolutions in the second half of the second decade of
the 21st century, an interesting development has taken
place. Hitherto hegemonic orders, such as globalisation,
free trade, and neoliberalism, lost their invincible posi-
tion, and even climate politics was pushed out of its com-
fortable post-political place within which we would all
agree. The Gilets Jaunes made clear to the entire world
that climate politics is a class struggle and in no way an
uncontested domain. It is in this context that we wit-
nessed, and should make sense of, the emergence of the
biggest grassroots climate mobilisations ever seen.
3. Politicisation of Tactics
Why should we continue going to school when there
is no future waiting for us? (Youth for Climate, 2018)
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“There is No Planet B,” “Act Now,” “Climate Justice
Now”: The movement’s main slogans do not sound very
inspiring at first sight. They are exactly the same slo-
gans as those used during the COP15 demonstrations
in Copenhagen in 2009, and during all climate demon-
strations that followed from then onwards. But what
is new, radical, and turns out to be incredibly mobilis-
ing is the idea that it is legitimate, even necessary, to
skip school to demonstrate against climate change. “Our
only way to exert pressure is by skipping school, just
as a labourer who strikes in his company,” explains one
of the movement’s spokespersons in a newspaper inter-
view (“Zo’n 3.000 klimaatspijbelaars,” 2019). While the
youth climate strikers are not the first to skip school for a
higher goal, their tactics seem to be evenmore appealing
because they resonate with the point they want to make.
Tactics and message converge in the idea that there is
no point in attending school when confronted with cli-
mate change: In order to tackle climate change, we need
political pressure, not studying or even more science.
With this argument, themovement breakswith the hege-
monic technocratic approach to climate change, which
elevates their tactics’ stakes. As one of the movement’s
spokespersons states during a speech at the very first
Belgian School Climate Strike: “We spend all our youth on
school benches. The message is that studying hard will
bring us far, but I don’t believe that any longer. What is
far? If all proof resulting from scientific research is sim-
ply neglected?” (De Wolf & Arnoudt, 2019). This argu-
mentation is part of a broader, international narrative
that “‘going to school begins to be pointless’ with the
climate crisis looming” (Fisher, 2019). Or, as two young
climate activists state in a well-shared op-ed: “Why do
we skip school for the climate? Our future does not only
depend on our studies, but also on the climate” (Verbeke
& Vanderstricht, 2019). They add that time pressure
strongly influences their strategies: “We do not have the
time to wait till we have the right to vote or can become
politicians ourselves.” It is also this argument that pro-
vokesmost reactions in first instance. Soon, a vast debate
takes off on whether it is legitimate to skip school to
demonstrate against climate change. Several right-wing,
liberal and conservative politicians claim that the cli-
mate problem will not be solved by civil disobedience:
“We also and especially need knowledge and technology.
Therefore, we have to study, develop new ideas,” as a
well-cited academic claims (Boudry, 2019). Addressing
the climate strikers directly, he states: “You can con-
tribute to that as well, with your smart brains. Do you
understand now why some people think it is ironic that,
of all things, you leave school to save the climate?”
The youth climate strikers do not show many signs of
being impressed: “They tell us that we have to study,
and get to know the science, but then we see that politi-
cians neglect all science about the climate completely”
(De Wolf & Arnoudt, 2019). Whereas mainstream actors
resort to a conventional technocratic discourse which
underscores the importance of education, science, inno-
vation, and expertise, more progressive voices embrace
the movement’s politicising push, arguing that we know
by nowwhat the problem is.Whereas the first stress that
pupils have to obey public order, the latter argue that
civic responsibilities might sometimes exactly entail vio-
lating that order.
Calling for a school strike is a politicising message
in itself: pupils decide to distance themselves from the
place that is attributed to them in society. This is the
type of argument Rancière (2001; see also Dikeç, 2012)
uses when conceptualising political action: By breach-
ing the established ‘police order,’ which requires pupils
to attend school every single school day, they politi-
cise their own role or position in society. This does not
mean that the extent to which pupils have to emanci-
pate themselves from social expectations does not vary
greatly. While some get parental approval and even sup-
port from their (head) teachers to join the demonstra-
tions, others have a much harder path to walk. However,
in both cases, they make themselves into political sub-
jects, who no longer understand themselves merely as
school pupils but also as potentially active agents of
change. Furthermore, through their actions, they create
a conflict in society, not only between politicians but also
between (head) teachers, parents, and even pupils them-
selves. As Mouffe (2002, 2006) has convincingly argued,
conflict can stir passion, as it shows that something is at
stake. It can thereby set in motion processes of political
subjectification. That the Climate Strikes are a passion-
ate affair is clear from the intense atmosphere during
the demonstrations. The improvised and uncontrolled
parade through the city, the climbing on scaffolds and
carrying of road signs, the sexualised messages—all con-
tribute to the subversive character of the strikes.
While the politicising dynamic starts with the ques-
tion of whether it is legitimate to skip school for the cli-
mate, the dynamic does not stop there. Maybe for the
first time in Belgian history, we witness an explicit dis-
cussion in the centre of the political arena onwhat has to
happen to tackle climate change. Because of the central-
ity of the topic and the passion with which it is publicly
displayed, voices from all over the political spectrum feel
obliged to position themselves. Significantly, however,
Youth for Climate does not really take position itself.
4. One Generation, One Voice
One generation, one voice. We demand climate jus-
tice to ensure a promising future for our generation
and the generations that follow. (Youth for Climate,
2019a)
During the demonstrations, the demand for intergenera-
tional justice figures centrally. With slogans like “It is Our
Future,” “OurWorld, Our Future, Our Choice,” and “Don’t
Burn Our Future,” the youth climate strikers accuse previ-
ous generations of having left themwith bleak future per-
spectives. By pointing to themselves as the future victims
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of climate change, they do not only establish a dividing
line, but also point to and enact a subject of change.
However, not long after the first strike, their own
complicity in the climate crisis is publicly displayed.
Critics denounce the double standard within the cli-
mate strikers’ discourse, targeting in particular the fly-
ing behaviour of many young people. “But if they go
on holiday, the teenagers take the plane, which is, as
we know, a big source of pollution,” is stated in a press
release on the day of the very first strike (Van Driessche,
2019). The youth climate strikers answer that structural
changes are needed, not individual ones: “It should not
only be about what citizens can do themselves. Much
more is needed. We need structural action if we want
to avoid the coming catastrophe” (Youth for Climate,
2019b). Furthermore, they denounce the depoliticising
thrust of the critique. As a well-shared op-ed states:
“As soon as young people act like citizens, one tries to
turn them into consumers again.Whileministers pretend
to be happy with the juvenile climate engagement, they
try to get rid of the political message” (Vandepitte et al.,
2019). Still, the question remains whether young people
are really only victims of climate change. Slogans such
as “One Generation, One Voice” tend to make abstrac-
tion from the massive inequalities in responsibilities and
victimhood, both in the here and now and in what is
framed as ‘our common future.’ Sherilyn MacGregor
(2014) speaks in this context about the ‘big we’ which
has characterised environmental discourse for decades.
Erik Swyngedouw (2015) argues that, in so far as climate
change is projected into the future, abstraction is made
from those who are living in the apocalypse here and
now. With an intergenerational dividing line, both the
previous and the future generations also risk being pre-
sented as homogenised categories.
Definitely, every politicisation entails a depoliticisa-
tion (Kenis, 2015; see also Mouffe, 2006). Every con-
struction of an ‘us’ and ‘them’ conceals, or at least
de-emphasises, other divisions, internal to the con-
structed ‘us’ and ‘them.’ It is never possible to politicise
all potential conflict lineswithout dissolving amovement
as a united entity. Politicising every potential conflict line
means there is no ‘us’ anymore but only a sum of individ-
uals who agonistically relate to each other. At the same
time, an ‘us’ can exist only by mercy of a ‘them.’ In that
sense, the challenge is to keep the ‘us’ big enough to
have political leverage and be able to speak of a move-
ment, but not so big that it includes everyone. In other
words, politicisation is a double-edged sword. As a result,
movements are always and by definition balancing unsta-
bly between different us–them formations and are char-
acterised by a continuous negotiation on where to draw
the lines between multiple potential ‘us-s’ and ‘them-s’.
The challenge this brings becomes clear soon.Where the
movement starts with Youth for Climate, they are quickly
joined by Students for Climate, Scientists for Climate,
Workers for Climate, and even Grandparents for Climate.
The movement broadens, and as a result its initial fault
line evaporates. Whereas part of its mobilising thrust
resided in the establishment of a conflict line, soon the
movement ends upwith an ‘all together’ discourse again.
5. The Future is Haunted by the Past
How can I study, pursue a career and have children
when theworld is about to fall apart? (Wauters, 2019)
This does not mean that an intergenerational conflict
line cannot be interesting or politicising as such. Several
social movements have aimed at realising social change
by drawing a line between the current generation and
the previous ones, emancipating themselves from the
legacy of the past. A well-known example is the gener-
ation of May ’68 and the way in which they aimed at
breaking with existing forms of authority in the family
or at school, or with consumer society. Staging yourself
as ‘the new generation’ that will make the difference
can definitely be a very politicising act: It is an attempt
to start anew, to uproot the foundations of the exist-
ing social order and put society on a new footing. Is this
acknowledgement of the fundamental alterability of the
foundations of the hegemonic order not exactly what
politicisation is about? As Slavoj Žižek (2000, p. 199) puts
it: “The political act (intervention) proper is not simply
something that works well within the framework of the
existing relations, but something that changes the very
framework that determines how things work.”
However, while for May ’68ers the future was open,
for the youth climate strikers the future is haunted by
the past. A famous wall painting of the period of May ’68
reads: “The future will only contain what we put into it
now.” The same, however, cannot be said of the predica-
ment the youth climate strikers find themselves in. Their
frustration is exactly that they will not be able to get rid
of the legacy of the past. The past looks at them from
the future: the greenhouse gases emitted in the past
are there to stay. Even worse, their cumulative effect
will be felt only in the future. But there are other differ-
ences between the generation ofMay ’68 and the school
skippers for climate as well, characterising the School
Climate Strikes in ways which sometimes correspond to
the depoliticising thrust that Swyngedouw (2007, 2010)
criticises in mainstream climate discourse. To start with,
the discourse of Youth for Climate does not somuch start
from the desire to create another future as from the need
to do so. While May ’68 was about changing ‘life as we
know it,’ at least part of the youth climate movement
wants to ward off climate change in order to preserve
or protect what we currently value and know. While
May ’68 was hugely emancipatory in terms of young
people’s self-understanding, staging themselves as the
generation that would make the difference, the School
Climate Strikes ask people in power to act on their behalf.
Finally, and most importantly, the intergenerational
conflict of May ’68 was accompanied by a strong politi-
cisation of dividing lines in the here and now.
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6. Empty Demands
The actions of Youth for Climate are intended to bring
politicians, CEOs and powerful people together to
implement ecological measures. (Youth for Climate,
2019a)
Dividing lines in the here and now are exactly what
Youth for Climate’s public discourse seems to be lacking.
As they argue: “It is important to reach out to everyone in
order to tackle the climate problem together” (Youth for
Climate, 2019a). It is at least a remarkable observation:
While the world is polarising, the youth climate move-
ment tries to keep or bring everyone together (again).
The necessary condition for this far-reaching form of
collaboration is that the movement keeps its demands
empty. Its main objective is the establishment of a cli-
mate law, without much substantial content attached
to it. Along the same lines, the movement argues that
“the next government needs to be a climate government”
(Youth for Climate, 2019a), regardless of the political par-
ties which constitute it. They claim they do not need
to answer the question of what has to happen exactly.
As they contend: “This is not something Youth for Climate
has to figure out. There are enough (climate) experts
who are currently ignored” (Youth for Climate, 2019a).
In line with broader international tendencies, it is
first and foremost the political right which denounces
the apolitical thrust of this approach. In an inflamma-
tory debate, a Flemish nationalist politician argues that
betting on a climate law “opens the door to a sys-
tem in which judges can determine what politics can
decide” (Cattebeke, 2019). A centre-right liberal politi-
cian, in turn, complains that in this way, “climate pol-
itics comes into the hands of judges and technocrats,”
and a Christian-democrat politician argues that poli-
tics “has the task of voting for concrete proposals that
are clear in terms of what they stand for” (Cattebeke,
2019). The movement, however, does not seem to be
impressed by the reproach of being apolitical. To the con-
trary, the apolitical character of their approach is exactly
what they consider a strength. They assert that they
start from “an apolitical standpoint—because climate is
a cause which concerns everyone” (Youth for Climate,
2019a). More specific guidelines have to come from “an
independent panel of climate experts” and have to be
based on “neutral scientific facts” (Youth for Climate,
2019a). To put these ideas into practice, they address
Flemish Government Architect Leo Van Broeck and for-
mer President of the IPCC Jean-Pascal van Ypersele and
“urge them to let [them] and policy makers know which
evidence-based solutions exist to halt the climate crisis”
(Youth for Climate, 2019b).
The claim that all their proposals are apolitical—or
at least neutral, drawing directly on scientific research—
is striking. De Moor et al. (2020) observe in this context
a broader, international evolution in which “the main
change [in comparison with previous grassroots climate
mobilisations] appears to be the use of a more politically
‘neutral’ framing directed more strongly at state than
non-state actors.” Importantly, the movement’s politi-
cal allies, like Scientists for Climate, make similar claims.
A petition which gathered more than 3500 signatures
from academics in support of the Belgian School Strikes
for Climate adopts a for scientists unusual ‘political’
standpoint of unconditionally embracing the actions of
the school climate strikers, and a rather radical discourse
on the measures which should be implemented to turn
the tide. At the same time, however, they emphasise that
their proposals are “neutral” and “merely based on scien-
tific facts” (Scientists 4 Climate, 2019), failing to acknowl-
edge the political character of their choices.
Surely, it is part of science’s self-understanding to
perceive itself as neutral and even the opposite of pol-
itics (Lievens & Kenis, 2018). Still, that does not mean
that, in the construction of scientific discourses, no polit-
ical processes take place (Goeminne, 2012; Kenis, 2020).
Not only are the epistemological boundaries of scientific
research partly politically determined, but every trans-
lation into policy proposals also entails a decision in
terms of which scientific findings to focus on. Because
of the very nature of climate change, a very wide range
of human activities can be scientifically shown to con-
tribute to climate change. Exactly this lack of a clear
object of change is one of the main reasons why climate
change is so liable to depoliticisation (Kenis & Lievens,
2014). The challenge is therefore not to prove that a cer-
tain activity has a climate impact, as almost every activity
does, but to acknowledge that targeting particular activ-
ities always entails, next to a scientific evaluation, also a
political choice.
Of course, there might be good reasons for keep-
ing the demands empty and for opting for a strategic
depoliticisation. It can help keep themovement together
and prevent it from being absorbed by what was quickly
developing into a very tense political playing field dur-
ing the first weeks of the School Climate Strikes. But the
main reason the movement opted for a depoliticised dis-
course seems to lie elsewhere. More precisely, it seems
to be inspired by a ‘political’ choice. Just as the ‘post-
political condition’ never meant that politicising voices
were entirely absent (Mouffe, 2006), so does the current,
more ‘politicised’ conjuncture not mean that depoliti-
cising tendencies are no longer present. In that sense,
the explicitly apolitical features of the movement’s dis-
course could be considered the death throes of a van-
ishing post-political hegemony, or even an attempt to
restore or revitalise a lost post-political condition which
was omnipresent in green thinking for decades and
which was seen as a necessary condition for tackling cli-
mate change.
7. Depoliticisation, Recuperation, and Neutralisation
Leaving the determination of the content of the climate
struggle to actors outside the movement entails a risk.
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It means everyone can appropriate the struggle and give
it their own content and direction. This has a positive
side: it means that a real agonistic debate and thereby
a process of politicisation around the topic can arise.
However, it also means that under an apolitical umbrella,
a political project can take shape.
7.1. Sign for My Future
On 5 February 2020, shortly after the first Belgian School
Strikes for Climate, Sign for My Future is launched: an
impressive, corporate-funded environmental advertise-
ment campaign, including a large number of radio and
TV commercials, which was set up by a partnership
between the institutionalised environmental movement,
hundreds of CEOs,media people, and academics. It is the
largest of its kind ever launched in Belgium. The cam-
paign presented itself as “a citizens’ initiative that has
developed into a broad coalition of young people, cor-
porate executives, civil society organisations, the media
and the academic world” (Sign for My Future, 2019,
author’s italics). While the coming together of both
initiatives seems a coincidence, convergences develop
promptly. Leading figures of the Youth Climate Strikes,
such as Anuna De Wever and Kyra Gantois, are present
at the opening event and publicly support the campaign.
Furthermore, there is a striking similarity between their
aims: a climate law, an independent advisory panel of
climate experts, and a governmental investment plan.
Similar to Youth for Climate’s discourse, their proposals
are directed towards the government and presented as
merely apolitical.
Slavoj Žižek (1994) analyses these kinds of gestures
as the ‘masterstroke of ideology.’ As he argues, the domi-
nant ideology is the one that succeeds in presenting itself
as the opposite of ideology: as neutral, merely scientific,
or technological; as apolitical. Crucially, under the guise
of an apolitical discourse, a political project inevitably
takes shape. In the case of Sign for My Future, the under-
lying political stakes are already revealed in the choice
for a particular messenger: a group of hundreds of CEOs
(e.g., BNP Paribas, IKEA, Microsoft, Danone, Proximus,
and Unilever) present themselves as allies in the strug-
gle against climate change. Similarly, demands such as
the establishment of a governmental investment plan
“to help citizens and companies make the transition to
a sustainable society” (Sign for My Future, 2019) reveal
underlying political stakes. The point is that an apolitical
discourse is merely a political discourse which presents
itself as apolitical (Kenis, 2015). As Laclau and Mouffe
(2001; see also Mouffe, 2006) contend: While all social
relations are discursively constructed, and this always
entails the exercise of power, discourses can remain
blind to their own political dimension, or actively conceal
it. This is what makes them depoliticised or post-political.
A politicised and democratic discourse, in contrast, is one
which fully recognises its political inscription. In other
words, under the umbrella of an apolitical discourse, a
political project takes shape. The difference is that it is
not recognised as such and is therefore much less eas-
ily contestable.
7.2. Struggling to (De)Politicise Climate Change
Sign for My Future aims to put pressure on the govern-
ment through a large-scale petition.With posters spread-
ing messages such as “When I am older, I want to see
tornadoes on television, not in my garden,” “When I am
older, I want to shop for shoes, not for flippers,” “When
I am older, I want to play football on a green field, not in
a dry sand pit,” they aim at collecting signatures from a
broad public. At the same time, the campaign is increas-
ingly contested on social media. Is the climate strug-
gle about saving ‘life as we know it’? Is it about ward-
ing off the climate disasters that threaten ‘us’? Despite
the impressive coalition, the Sign for My Future cam-
paign is not the big success its designers had hoped
for. The petition gathers 267,000 signatures, which is
significant, but little in comparison with the resources
which were put into it, as one of its initiators later pub-
licly recognised (Dheedene, 2019). The campaign keeps
relying on (social) media and is barely picked up by
grassroots activists gathering signatures in the streets.
Its ‘consensus’ narrative about preserving ‘life as we
know it,’ spread through slogans concocted by market-
ing firms, not only misses the agonistic dimension which
can trigger passion by showing that something is at stake
(Mouffe, 2002), but also turns climate change into some-
thing superficial or meaningless. Who would be passion-
ate about mobilising for such an empty stake? The hid-
den political message fuelled the suspicion.
The initiators of the campaign, however, seem struck
dumb by the unexpected turn of events. Big is the con-
sternation that an initiative with a goal as noble as tack-
ling climate change is criticised. Three assumptions fig-
ure centrally in the ensuing debate. First, there is the
assumption of ‘convergence spaces’: the idea that dif-
ferent environmental initiatives can neatly exist next to
each other, as in the end, they all work towards the same
goal (North, 2011; Routledge, 2003). As a well-shared op-
ed, which aims at countering the critiques, reads: “A cli-
mate transition will happen when a hundred flowers can
bloom” (Goris, 2019). The problem with such a repre-
sentation is that it fails to acknowledge the struggles at
play below the surface and that it denies that divergent
ways of tackling climate change can be politically incom-
patible (Kenis, 2019). Second, there is the assumption
that we need ‘consensus’ in order to arrive at change.
This is exactly what generates the depoliticising dynamic
Mouffe (2006) has criticised in her work on post-politics.
The problemwith ‘consensus’ discourses is that theymis-
recognise the constitutive and mobilising role of ago-
nism in society and prevent the revelation of the politi-
cal grounds behind the technocratic andmarket-oriented
approaches at play. Third is the assumption that ‘the peo-
ple’ are apolitical, and therefore the only way to address
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 2, Pages 135–145 141
them would be through an apolitical approach. As the
chief editor of MO* magazine states:
I see the petition…as an instrument to communi-
cate with very large groups of citizens who are situ-
ated in the misty centre of the debate….Those citi-
zens…easily represent 50% of the electorate. This is
not the moment to be right in your own bubble, but
also within broader society (Goris, 2019)
Stated differently, the campaign is assumed to appeal
to a supposedly apolitical public that would be situated
somewhere in-between centre left and centre right. But
are ‘the people’ so apolitical today?
While the world is polarising, the new climate move-
ments project an aversion of politics on ‘the people,’
sticking to a post-political narrative whose time has
already passed. The regional, federal, and European elec-
tions of Sunday 26 May 2019 are experienced as a slap
in themovement’s face. “Flanders is radicalising,” reads a
newspaper headline (Eeckhout, 2019). The predicted vic-
tory for the green party does not materialise. The centre
parties lose to the benefit of the radical left and espe-
cially the far right.
7.3. Depoliticising Climate Change in a Polarising World
While the Youth Climate Strikes were highly successful
in terms of mobilising large numbers of people and suc-
ceeded in putting climate change at the heart of the pub-
lic agenda for months on end, it subsequently declined
without leaving many tangible results. The emptiness
of its demands made it relatively easy for oppositional
forces to endorse the movement’s demands while stick-
ing to ‘business as usual,’ thereby “neutralis[ing] [the
movement’s] subversive potential,” as Mouffe (2018,
p. 34) warns. In the same line, it allowed mainstream
voices to fill the void and, thereby, its demands to
be “recuperated by the existing system” (Mouffe, 2018,
p. 34). Consequently, the mobilising energy withered
away. The last calls for a strike no longer attracted many
participants, and after the elections of 26 May 2019, the
movement was struck by internal crises. This does not
mean the movement did not realise significant gains on
the symbolic level: climate change has been staged as a
matter of concern in unprecedented ways. Furthermore,
for young people, the strikes might well have been the
politicising experience of a lifetime. As Fisher (2019)
notes: “This growing movement is important beyond its
potential impact on climate policy because it is creat-
ing a cohort of citizens who will be active participants
in democracy.’’
8. Conclusion
Following Mouffe (2018, p. 9), who cites Machiavelli in
this respect, the task is to write “in the conjuncture”
instead of merely reflecting “over the conjuncture.” This
requires taking position in the here and now. This posi-
tioning has to start from an estimation of the current
political situation. Whereas a depoliticised climate dis-
course easily thrived in a post-political atmosphere, the
political context is different today. In a polarising world,
the challenge is “to seize the populist moment” by giv-
ing an emancipatory and democratic thrust to the politi-
cising tendencies which are present in society (Mouffe,
2018, p. 1). One way of doing that is through a politicisa-
tion of our perception of historical time.
As I have argued in this article, projecting climate
change into the future discursively conceals that the
catastrophe is already here. Focusing on the here and
now leads to a radically different position, allowing politi-
cisation along an intersection of social justice lines. For
that reason, it might be more interesting to understand
our current predicament in terms of the Anthropocene.
While the concept of the Anthropocene has been
rightly criticised for being discursively homogenising
and therefore depoliticising in itself (Malm & Hornborg,
2014), and arguably it would be better to speak about
the Capitalocene (Moore, 2016) or Oliganthropocene
(“epoch of a few men and even fewer women”;
Swyngedouw, 2013b), the reframing of the now as the
moment of crisis, as the ruin on which another future
has to be built, might be politically more interesting than
fighting an enemy whose teeth have yet to be revealed.
If we situate doomsday in the past, the future might
become more promising again. If there is no reason
to keep what we have, emancipatory politics become
an option again. Furthermore, opening up the debate
to more fundamental questions on how we as human
beings, for the first time in history and self-consciously
though mostly unwillingly, inscribe ourselves in geolog-
ical processes can radicalise and even revolutionise the
levels of changewe allow in our imaginaries (Clark, 2010).
Finally, such an approachmakes it easier to connect with
other struggles on the basis of which an emancipatory
and intersectional frontier can be built.
Drawing on Laclau and Mouffe’s (2001) earlier work,
such a frontier could be built through constructing chains
of equivalence between nodal points from a range of
different struggles, such as climate, anti-racist, and anti-
austerity politics. Interestingly, we recently also wit-
nessed the emergence of a number of initiatives along
these lines. With slogans like “Burn Borders Not Coal”
(Ende Gelände), “The Climate Crisis Is a Racist Crisis”
(Black Lives Matter), and “Climate Refugees Welcome”
(Lesbian and Gays Support the Migrants), activists have
emphasised the intersectionality of struggles. In the
same line, it might be useful to think about ways to
‘internalise the enemy’ and move beyond targeting CO2.
By pointing to specific social practices here and now, the
opponent acquires an identifiable face (Kenis & Lievens,
2021). Also, at this level, interesting initiatives have
been developed in recent years. Examples include the
Dutch initiative #Shellmustfall and its Belgian counter-
part #Ineoswillfall. Still, none of these initiatives have
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been as successful as the School Strikes for Climate so far,
especially in terms of their mobilising capacity. The lat-
ter might partly testify to the unpredictability of forms of
social upheaval: it is not because you follow all the steps
that you will have a cake.
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